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Abstract
Equal treatment for the present and the future was required in two ax-
ioms introduced in Chichilnisky [12] [15]. We provide a characterization
of the decision criterion that satisfy the axioms and show that the two
axioms are equivalent to physical limits in the long run future. We prove
that maximizing discounted utility with a long run survival constraint
is equivalent to maximizing a criterion that treats equally the present
and the future. The equal treatment axioms are therefore the essence of
sustainable development. The "weight" ￿ given to the long run future is
here identi￿ed with the marginal utility of the environmental asset along
a path that narrowly misses extinction. An existence theorem is also pro-
vided for optimizing according to the welfare criterion that treats equally
the present and the future. We show that no prior welfare criteria satisfy
the axioms for sustainable development introduced in [12].
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11 Introduction
Global warming and the plight of extinguishing species are attracting increasing
public attention, and leading to calls for new forms of economic development.
But sustainable development is hardly a new issue. The need for development
that satis￿es the basic needs of present and future generations was introduced
30 years ago 1 (Chichilnisky [9] [10] [43]), it was developed by the ILO and the
World Bank in country studies, and rea¢ rmed by international vote as a global
development priority 17 years ago 2 (Brundtland3 [7]). Yet the challenge to
achieve sustainable development remains today as elusive as ever. A change in
preferences is essential. What this article shows is that once we become aware of
new long term physical constraint on resources, such as the possible extinction
of a species, this invokes new behavioral axioms introduced in [12] requiring
equal treatment of the present and the future ￿and we behave according to the
decision criterion they imply. It is essential therefore that we focus on the limits
we face as a species. The article shows that the "equal treatment" axioms are
equivalent to preferences that re￿ ect awareness of physical limits. Therefore the
new axioms are the essence of sustainable development.
Implementing sustainable development is a moving target that requires more
than public attention and a change in values and preferences. It requires a solid
analysis of sustainability with the level of clarity and substance of neoclassical
theory, to support the practical scope and the current widespread use of markets
and cost bene￿t analysis.4 The crux of the matter is how, through markets,
we can de￿ne economic values that go beyond immediate individual gain and
encompass the needs of future generations.5 This motivation led me6 to propose
1The concept of development based on the satisfaction of basic needs was introduced by the
author in the mid 1970s in the Bariloche Model and several other publications (Chichilnisky
[9] [10] [43]) and became the cornerstone of e⁄orts to de￿ne sustainable development (see
[34]) in the 1987 Brundland Report [7], which uses the concept explicity, de￿ning sustainable
development as ￿ development that satis￿es the needs of the present and the future￿ .
2At the Earth Summit of Rio de Janaeiro 1992, where the concept of Basic Needs was
voted by 150 nations as the main concept of sustainable development.
3Brundland￿ s Report in 1987 [7] de￿ned ￿ sustainable development￿on the basis of basic
needs, as "a form of development that satis￿es the needs of the present without preventing
the future from satisfying its own needs". This was voted by 150 nations as a global priority in
the Earth Summit of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. Yet Basic Needs and Sustainable Development
are still to achieve mainstream status.
4Solow [55] pointed out that discussion of sustainability has been mainly an occasion for
the expression of emotions and attitudes, with very little formal analysis of sustainability or
of sustainable paths for a modern industrial economy. One purpose of Chichilnisky [12] and
[15] was to resolve this problem.
5Standard cost-bene￿t analysis discounts and undervalues the future [12] [15] [41]. It is
therefore biased against policies designed to provide bene￿ts in the very long run. An example
is the evaluation of projects for the safe disposal of waste from a nuclear power plant. Another
is policies designed for the prevention of global warming. The bene￿ts of both may be years
into the future. The costs, however, are here today. In these cases, the inherent asymmetry
between the treatment of present and future makes it hard to justify investment decisions that
large numbers of individuals and organizations clearly feel are well merited.
6Neoclassical theory of choice and preference theory was developed in the ￿rst part of the
20th century and is based in axioms from which ￿ present discounted value￿ and ￿ expected
2in 1993 two axioms to de￿ne sustainable development requiring equal treatment
for the present and the future, and to derive the decision criteria that they imply,
[12] [15]). The two axioms require that neither the present nor the future should
be "dictatorial." This article takes the matter further by solving outstanding
issues that were not covered in the original treatment: (i) what is the practical
basis for the new axioms, where do they come from? Exactly why and how do
individuals change their preferences and start taking into consideration the long
term future? (ii) how to identify in practice the weight given to the long run
future, and (iii) how to ensure the existence of sustainable solutions. The three
issues were raised in the subsequence literature on the topic [21] [22] [23] [24]
[25] [42].[46] [47] and are resolved here. In a nutshell we show in Theorem 3
that the new axioms are in fact a rational response to a new objective reality, a
reaction to new long term physical constraints that we face today and did not
exist before, and that the weight given to the long run future represents the
potential losses from the extinction of the resource in the long run. I also show
that the existence of solutions is guaranteed by the inability of physical systems
to adapt beyond a certain speed of response.
The implications of these results is clear. It is indisputable the world econ-
omy has changed, and that we face physical limits that did not exist before.
We have become aware of the possibility of the extinction of our species. This
article shows that this awareness leads us to behave according to the new axioms
[12] and the decision criterion that they imply.
2 Changing Preferences
It is worth underscoring the enormous physical transition that took place since
the middle of the 20th century, a period in which most economic analysis of
preferences was developed. For the ￿rst time in history, humans dominate the
planet and consume resources in a way that can alter the planet￿ s climate, its
water bodies and its biological mix. Fossil fuel energy used for production since
the second world war emitted carbon that could alter irreversibly the earth￿ s
climate with catastrophic consequences. Biologists see the loss of biodiversity
during the last sixty years as one of the four or ￿ve largest incidents of destruc-
tion of life on the planet, 1,000 times larger than fossil records show7. Of the
5487 known species of mammals - our relatives - 25% have become extinct.8
sending a somber message to the rest.
A voracious use of resources since World War II originated largely in the
industrial countries, and was accompanied by increasing discrepancies in re-
source consumption and welfare between industrial and developing countries,
the North and the South.[26]. The problem has been high in the international
utility anlysis￿were derived. They were created by Tjallings Koopmans for the case of choice
over time and by Von Neumann for the case of choice under uncertainty and grew to achieve
the status of common knowledge [1] [41] [15] [12] [42]
7According to the UN 2000 Millenium Report [45], see also Chichilnisky [32]
8See Jan Schipper et al, Science October 10 2008 [56]: ￿The Status of the World￿ s Land
and Marine Mammals: Diversity Threat and Knowledge" p. 225-229.
3agenda since the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, where
the issue of sustainable development 9 emerged as one of the most urgent topics
of international policy and one hundred and ￿fty nations endorsed UN Agenda
21 requiring new patterns of sustainable development that can satisfy the basic
needs of the present and the future.10 Yet little progress has been achieved since
then. The use of biodiversity and fossil fuels has increased rapidly and water is
now the most scarce resource in the world. 11
The "equal treatment" axioms for the present and the future have not been
debated, partly because there is general agreement now that economics has to
take account of the long run [35] [36] [39] [41] [42] [44] [46] [49] [50] [55]. Yet
three outstanding issues emerged in the ensuing literature 12 and are resolved
here. The ￿rst is how to explain the practical meaning of the new axioms -
where do they come from? Theorem 3 shows that if we are aware of long term
constraints, then we must accept the two "equal treatment" axioms proposed
in 1993 [12] and the decision criteria that they imply. The new axioms are
equivalent to the awareness of physical limits in the long run future.
A second related issue is how to compute the "weight" ￿ that is assigned
to the long run future by a sustainable preference13 The initial representation
theorem provided in [12] had a degree of freedom for this parameter, which
remained unde￿ned. This can be considered a useful feature of the theory,
and parallels the two degrees of freedom that appear in traditional discounted
utility analysis, namely the ￿ instantaneous utility￿and the ￿ discount factor￿that
are used to de￿ne discounted utility, and were left unde￿ned. Yet it can be
useful to identify the value of the "weight" ￿ in speci￿c cases, to show how it
can be computed in practice. In this article we consider the case of renewable
resources that can become extinct when overused, a timely issue since 25% of all
known mammals are now extinct [56]. Theorem 3 establishes that the optimizing
according to the new axioms and the attendant preferences, is equivalent to
9At the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, sustainable development
emerged as one of the most urgent subjects for international policy. As already pointed out,
one hundred and ￿fty participating nations endorsed UN Agenda 21, proposing as part of its
policy agenda sustainable development based on the satisfaction of basic needs in developing
countries.
10As pointed out above, the development criterion based on the satisfaction of basic needs,
was introduced and developed empirically by the author in 1976 in the ￿ Bariloche Model￿and in
several scienti￿c publications in the mid 1970s, [9] [10] [43]. and given further impetus in 1987
when the Brundtland Commission proposed that "sustainable development is development
that satis￿es the needs of the present without undermining the needs of the future" Brundtland
(1987, chap. 2, para. 1).
11The global use of resources and the di⁄erence of consumption between poor and rich
nations has become more acute since 1992, Chichilnisky [32].
12For example, at a recent presentation during a Seminar in Cargese, France in the Spring of
2007 Charles Perrings argued that my criterion of sustainable preferences (which arises from
my two axioms) was less applicable because we did not know the exact value of the parameter
￿ that appears in front of the long run future utility. A similar point was made by a Columbia
University colleague, Peter Eisenberger. Both seem misplaced concerns, as explained above,
since the ￿exibility in the parameter is a valuable aspect of the theory.
13This is represented by a real number "￿" that appears in the representation of a sustainable
utility, see Chichilnisky [12] [15]
4optimizing based on a new physical constraint on the resource in the long term,
and that the factor ￿ is the marginal utility of the resource at the point of
extinction This is the point where the resource is presumably most valuable.
Theorem 4 resolves the issue of existence of optimal solutions, using Sobolev￿ s
Theorem that provides conditions of "bounded variation" on the consumption
paths, see also [15] and [14]. The last section examines a list of previously used
preferences and shows that none satisfy the axioms of sustainability de￿ned
here, so this theory of sustainable development represents genuine change. The
results provided here add a new angle to the initial axioms and the sustainable
preferences they imply. These results help to compute solutions and explain
further the emergence of sustainable preferences as awareness about the depth
and scope of biodiversity destruction and the risk of potentially catastrophic
climate change in the long run future. In other words, to change our preferences
what is needed is to increase awareness of the new long term physical constraints.
3 Experimental evidence on how we value the
long run
In the last twenty years many experiments have measured how people value the
long run (see, e.g., Lowenstein and Thaler [49], Cropper, Aydede, and Portney
[36], and the references in Lowenstein and Elster [50]). Their ￿ndings clash with
the traditional discounted utility approach. In practice, people value the present
and the future di⁄erently from the theoretical predictions of standard analysis;
the present and the future are treated more evenhandedly. Typically we discount
the future, but our trade-o⁄between today and tomorrow blurs as we move into
the future. Tomorrow acquires increasing more importance as time progresses.
It is as if we viewed the future through a curved lens. The relative weight given
to two subsequent periods in the future is inversely related to their distance from
today. The period-to-period rate of discount is inversely related to the distance
into the future. The experimental evidence shows that rate of discount between
period t and period t + 1 decreases with t. Interestingly, studies of human
responses to sound summarized in the Weber-Fechner law [15] [42], indicate
similar responses to changes in sound intensity: The human ear responds to
sound stimuli in an inverse relation to the initial stimulus. Resent research by
Lieberman and Trope [48] con￿rms the psychology of transcending the here and
now and shows that our mental space traverses temporal, spatial, and social
distance through the same abstract processing of information. Recent empirical
research shows considerable similarity in the way people mentally transverse
these di⁄erent types of distances, and how we evaluate, predict and plan near
and distant situations.
How to explain this experimental evidence, our sensitivity to time, and how
to integrate it into a criterion of optimality? Several interesting alternatives to
the discounted utility analysis have been proposed. So far none had reached
the clarity and consistency of the discounted utilitarian criterion used in cost-
5bene￿t analysis, nor its analytical tractability . Prominent examples are the
"overtaking criterion," [57] Ramsey￿ s criterion [52] and Basic Needs [9] [10] .
However, these criteria are incomplete, failing to rank many reasonable paths.
The ordering induced by the overtaking criterion cannot be represented by a
real valued function, making it impractical to use. As a result, they lack the
corresponding "shadow" prices to evaluate costs and bene￿ts in an impartial
fashion. These criteria therefore fail on practical grounds. The last section of
this article examines these and other criteria that were previously used.
In 1993 [12] proposed simple axioms that capture the concept of sustain-
ability, and derived the welfare criterion which they imply, see also [15]. The
criterion that emerges is complete and analytically tractable. In optimization it
leads to shadow prices which can be used for a "sustainable cost-bene￿t analy-
sis." The new axioms provide internal consistency and ethical clarity. They
imply a more symmetric treatment of generations in the sense that neither the
"present" nor the "future" should be favored over the other. They neither ac-
cept the romantic view which relishes the future without regards for the present,
nor the consumerist view which ranks the present above all. The axioms lead
to a complete characterization of sustainable preferences, which are sensitive to
the welfare of all generations and o⁄er an equal opportunity to the present and
to the future. Trade-o⁄s between present and future consumption are allowed.
The existence and characterization of ￿ sustainable preferences￿appeared ￿rst in
Chichilnisky [15]14 and sustainable preferences were shown to be a natural ex-
tension of the "equal treatment criterion" for ￿nitely many generations, in the
sense that the optimal solutions for such preferences approach the "turnpike"
of an ￿ equal-weight ￿nite horizon optimization problem as the horizon increases
[15]. Theorem 3 of Chichilnisky [15] showed that sustainable preferences match
the experimental evidence in these cases, in the sense that they imply a rate
of discount that decreases and approaches zero as time goes to in￿nity, and
Theorem 4 investigated the relationship between the optimal paths according
to sustainable preferences and discounted utilitarianism in an extension of the
classical Hotelling problem of the optimal depletion of an exhaustible resource.
Theorem 5 in [15] showed that sustainable optima can be quite di⁄erent from
discounted optima, no matter how small is the discount factor.
4 Two Axioms for Sustainable Development
The two axioms of Chichilnisky [12] are non-dictatorship properties [1] [8]. Ax-
iom 1 requires that the present should not dictate the outcome in disregard for
the future : it requires sensitivity to the welfare of generations in the distant
future. Axiom 2 requires that the future should not dictate the outcome in dis-
regard for the present, and thus requires sensitivity to the present. To o⁄er a
formal perspective a few de￿nitions are required. Each generation is represented
by an integer g;g = 1;2;:::An in￿nitely lived world obviates the need to make
14An alternative name for "sustainable preferences" was suggested by Robert Solow in
personal communication: "intertemporally equitable preferences."
6decisions contingent on an unknown terminal date. Generations could overlap
or not. Indeed agents could be in￿nitely long-lived and evaluate development
paths for their own futures For ease of comparison, I adopt a formulation which
is as close as possible to that of [12] and to the standard neoclassical model.
Each generation g has a preference that can be represented by a utility function
ug for consumption of n goods, some of which could be environmental goods
such as water, or soil, so that consumption vectors are in Rn, and ug : Rn ! R:
The availability of goods in the economy can be constrained in a number of
ways, for example by a di⁄erential equation which represents the growth of the
stock of a renewable resource and/or the accumulation and depreciation of cap-
ital. We ignore for the moment population growth, although this issue can be
incorporated with little change in the results, at the cost of more notation.15
The space of all feasible consumption paths is indicated F = fx : x =
fxgg;g = 1;2;:::;xg 2 Rng:We chose a utility representation so that each gen-
eration￿ s utility function is bounded below and above: u : Rn ! R+, and
ess supx2Rn(ug(x)) < K: This choice is not restrictive: it was shown by Ar-
row [2] that when ranking in￿nite streams of utilities as done here one should
work with bounded utility representations since doing otherwise could lead to
paradoxes 16. In order to eliminate some of the most obvious problems of
comparability I normalize the supremum of utilities to be 1, Arrow [1] and
[8].17 In this case we are concerned with fairness across generations, see also
Solow [55], Lauwers [46] [47] Chichilnisky [9] [8], and Beltratti, Chichilnisky,
and Heal [5] [21] [22] [23] . The space of feasible utility streams is therefore
Q = f￿ : ￿ = (￿g);g = 1;2;:::;￿g = ug(xg) 2 R;g = 1;2;::g:
5 The Present and the Future
Each utility stream is a sequence of positive real numbers bounded by the num-
ber 1. The space of all utility streams is contained as a bounded set in in the
space of all in￿nite bounded sequences of real numbers, denoted F = l1:18
A welfare criterion W should rank elements of F; for all possible f 2 F: The
welfare criterion W is complete if it is represented by an increasing real valued
function de￿ned on all bounded utility streams W : l1 ! R: It is called sensi-
tive or increasing, if whenever a utility stream ￿ is obtained from another ￿ by
increasing the welfare of some generation, then W ranks ￿ strictly higher than
15Population growth and utilitarian analysis are well known to make an explosive mix,
which is however outside the scope of this paper.
16The need to work with bounded utility representation is pointed out by K. Arrow [2], who
requires boundedness to solve the problem that gave rise to Daniel Bernouilli￿ s famous paper
on the "St . Petersburg paradox".
17A preference admits more than one utility representation ; among these one chooses a
bounded representation . Utility functions u that are nonnegative and all stare a common
bound, which I assume without loss of generality to be 1.
18Formally : l1 = fy : y = fyg);g = 1;::: : yg 2 R+ and supg k yg k< Kg. Here k : k
denotes the absolute value that is used to endow l1 with a standard Banach space structure,




Intuitively, the present is represented by all the utility streams which have no
future: for any given utility stream ￿, its "present" is represented by all ￿nite
utility steams which are obtained by cutting a o⁄ after any number of genera-
tions. Formally:
DEFINITION 1 . For any utility stream ￿ and any integer K let ￿K be
the "K-cut o⁄" of the sequence ￿, the sequence whose coordinates up to and
including the K-th are equal to those of ￿, and zero after the K-th.
DEFINITION 2. The present consists of all feasible utility streams which
have no future i.e., it consists of the cuto⁄s of all utility streams, as de￿ned
above in De￿nition 1.
5.2 The Future
By analogy, for any given utility stream a, its "future" is represented by all
in￿nite utility streams which are obtained as the "tail" resulting from cutting a
o⁄ for any ￿nite number of generations.
DEFINITION 3. The K-th tail of ￿ is the sequence whose coordinates up
to and including the K-th are zero and equal to those of ￿ after the K-th
generation.
5.3 No Dictatorship of the Present
DEFINITION 4. A welfare function W : l1 ! R gives a dictatorial role to the
present,19 and is called a dictatorship of the present, if W is insensitive to the
utility levels of all but a ￿nite number of generations, i.e., if W is only sensitive
to the "cuto⁄s" of utility streams, and it disregards the utility levels of all
generations from some generation on. Formally , for every ￿;￿; W(￿) > W(￿)
if and only if there exists an N > 0; N = N(￿;￿) such that W(￿0) > W(￿
0)
for any ￿0;￿
0 that di⁄er from ￿ and ￿ only in their elements after N; namely
8g < N; ￿g = ￿0
g and ￿g = ￿
0
g:The following axiom eliminates dictatorships of
the present:
Axiom 1: No dictatorship of the present.
5.4 No Dictatorship of the Future
DEFINITION 5. A welfare function W gives a dictatorial role to the future,
and is called a dictatorship of the future, if W is insensitive to the utility levels
of any ￿nite number of generations, or equivalently it is only sensitive to the
utility levels of the "tails" of utility streams. Formally, for every ￿;￿; W(￿) >
19The representability of the order W by a real valued function can be obtained from
more primitive assumptions, such as, for example, transitivity, completeness, and continuity
conditions.
8W(￿) if and only if there exists an N > 0; N = N(￿;￿) such that W(￿0) >
W(￿
0) for any ￿0;￿
0 that di⁄er from ￿ and ￿ only in their elements prior to
N;namely 8g > N; ￿g = ￿0
g and ￿g = ￿
0
g: The welfare criterion W is therefore
only sensitive to the utilities of "tails" of streams, and in this sense the future
always dictates the outcome independently of the present. The following axiom
eliminates dictatorships of the future:
Axiom 2: No dictatorship of the future.
5.5 Sustainable Preferences
DEFINITION 6. A sustainable preference is a complete sensitive continuous
preference W : l1 ! R satisfying Axioms 1 and 2: it is therefore neither a
dictatorship of the present nor a dictatorship of the future.
6 Existence and Characterization of Sustainable
Preferences
Why is it di¢ cult to rank in￿nite utility streams? Ideally one would give equal
weight to every generation. For example, with a ￿nite number N of generations,
each generation can be assigned weight 1=N. But when trying to extend this
criterion to in￿nitely many generations one encounters the problem that, in
the limit, every generation is given zero weight. What is done usually to solve
this problem is to attach more weight to the utility of near generations, and
less weight to future ones. An example is of course the sum of discounted
utilities . Discounted utilities give a bounded welfare level to every utility stream
which assigns each generation the same utility. Two numbers can always be
compared, so that the criterion so de￿ned is clearly complete. However, the sum
of discounted utilities is not even-handed: it disregards the long-run future. It
was shown in Chichilnisky [12] [15] that it is a dictatorship of the present as
de￿ned above. Another solution is the criterion de￿ned by the long-run average
of a utility stream, a criterion used frequently in repeated games. However, this
criterion is not even-handed either: it is biased in favor of the future and against
the present. It is insensitive to the welfare of any ￿nite number of generations.20
Here matters stood for some time. Asking for the two axioms together, the non
dictatorship of the present and the non dictatorship of the future, as required
by the Axioms above, appears almost as if it would lead to an impossibility
theorem. Not quite.
Let us reason again by analogy with the case of ￿nite generations. The
number of generations one can assign weights which decline into the future, and
then assign some extra weight to the last generation. This procedure, when
extended naturally to in￿nitely many generations, is neither dictatorial for the
20Other interesting incomplete intergenerational criteria which have otherwise points in
common with sustainable preferences are found in Asheim [3] [4]
9present nora dictatorship of the future. It is similar to adding to a sum of dis-
counted utilities, the long-run average of the whole utility stream. Neither part
of the sum is acceptable on its own, but together they are. This is Theorem 1
in Chichilnisky [12]. Theorem 2 in [12] proved that a similar procedure gives
a complete characterization of all continuous sustainable preferences. The ￿rst
part of Theorem 1 establishes that the sum of a dictatorship of the present
plus a dictatorship of the future is in fact neither. The ￿rst part is sensitive
to the present, and the second is sensitive to the future. Furthermore such
a sum admits trade-o⁄s between the welfare of the present and of the future.
Theorem 1 in [12] made this reasoning rigorous, see also Theorem 1 below and
the Appendix. The second part of Theorem 1 below shows that all known cri-
teria of optimality used until now fail to satisfy the axioms postulated here,
and is proved in the Appendix. Therefore the sustainable preferences de￿ned
here perform a role satis￿ed by no previously used criterion. What is perhaps
more surprising is that the sustainable welfare criteria identi￿ed here, namely
the sum of a dictatorship of the present and one of the future, exhaust all the
continuous utilities that satisfy my two axioms. This means that any continuous
sustainable preference must be of the form just indicated . This is Theorem 2
below, see also [12]. The results of Theorem 3 below add another aspect to the
characterization of sustainable preferences - it shows that a sum of a dictator-
ship of the present and one of the future represents the essence of sustainable
development, since maximizing such preferences is equivalent to the awareness
of a new resource constraint in the long run into the standard discounted utility
framework used until now.
6.1 Existence of Sustainable Preferences
Theorem 1
Theorem 1: There exists a sustainable preference W : l1 ! R, i.e., a
preference which is sensitive and does not assign a dictatorial role to either the
present or the future




where 1 > ￿ > 0; 8g; ￿g > 0;
P1
g=1 ￿g￿g < 1; and ￿(￿) is the function
￿(￿) = limg!1 ￿g when this limit exists extended to all of l1 by means of Hahn
Banach￿ s theorem.21 None of the welfare criteria used until now in economics
21The linear map "limg ￿g" is de￿ned by using the Hahn-Banach theorem, as follows: de￿ne
￿rst the function on the closed subset of l1 denoted
￿
l1 consisting of those sequences ￿g that
have a limit. On
￿
l1 the function is de￿ned as the sequence￿ s limit limg ￿g; the function is
then extended continuously to all sequences in the whole space l1 by using the Hahn-Banach
theorem, which ensures that such an extension exists, it is continuous and can be constructed
while preserving the norm of the initial function de￿ned on the closed subspace of convergent
subsequences, see [12] [58].
10satis￿es these new axioms: (a) the sum of discounted utilities, for any ￿xed
discount factor no matter how small, (b) Ramsey￿ s criterion, (c) the overtaking
criterion, (d) lim inf, (e) long-run averages22, (f) Rawlsian rules, (g) Basic Needs
and (h) The Green Golden Rule g￿ ([5]).
Proof:
For a proof see the Appendix and also Chichilnisky [12] [15]. The Appendix
includes a de￿nition of the prior criteria and shows how they fail the sustain-
ability or equal treatment axioms.
6.2 Characterization of Sustainable Preferences
The existence theorem presented above has been extended to provide a complete
characterization of sustainable preferences in Chichilnisky [12]:
Theorem 2: Let W : l1 ! R be a continuous sustainable preference. Then
W is of the form




where1 > ￿ > 0;8g; ￿g > 0;
P1
g=1 ￿g￿g < 1 and where ￿(￿) is a ￿nitely
additive measure on l1:23
Proof:
For a proof see the Appendix and also Chichilnisky [12],[15].
7 How we change preferences: Origin of the new
Axioms
This section explains how preferences change and the origin of the axioms de-
￿ned in [12]. The theorems below prove that under certain conditions maxi-
mizing a sustainable preference is mathematically equivalent to maximizing a
standard preference with a new additional constraint at in￿nity, a constraint
that did not exist before.24 The implication of this is that as we become aware
of new physical constraints in the long run and consider these in making deci-
sions, this leads us to behave according to the two axioms [12] that treat equally
the present and the future, and to optimize the decision criteria that they imply.
22For example the two sequences (1, 0, 0,111, 0, 0, 0, 0,1,1,1,1,1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,1 . . . . )
and (0,1,1, 0, 0, 0, 1,1,1,1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,1,1,1,1,1,1, 0. . . . ) are not comparable according to
the long-run averages criterion .
23For de￿nitions and examples of purely ￿nitely additive measures, see the [12] and the
Appendix. A purely ￿nitely additive measure can be de￿ned on the line R as well as on a
￿nite interval such as [0,1].
24For simplicity in the following we consider a simple preferences that are the sum of dis-
counted utilities, and where ￿ = l1:More general results are possible at the cost of more
notation.
11The Theorem presented below resolves an outstanding issue that was pointed
out about sustainable preferences: it identi￿es in practical terms a parameter,
the "weight" ￿ that sustainable preferences assign to the long term future,
appearing in the characterization Theorem 2 above and in [12]. The parameter
￿ can be identi￿ed with the marginal value of an environmental asset that could
disappear, computed at the point of its possible extinction.





R ￿(x)d￿ where f(x) 2 L
+
1 so ￿ is a ￿nite
measure on R: In the following such a W is also called a standard discounted
utility preference over in￿nite streams. Theorem 3 establishes under certain
conditions the equivalence between two optimization problems: (1) optimizing
a sustainable preference W￿ and (2) optimizing a standard preference W with
an added constraint in the long run, or ￿ at in￿nity￿ . For simplicity, we sepa-
rate the existence problem from the characterization of solutions. Theorem 3
characterizes the solutions, assuming that they exist. Theorem 4 establishes
conditions that are su¢ cient for the existence of solutions.
Theorem 3 suggests how sustainable preferences emerge from standard pref-
erences: upon the consideration of new constraints at in￿nity, for example, from
new survival constraints in the long run on a renewable resource such as an ani-
mal species, a constraint that was not considered or did not exist before. When
the constraint represents a requirement to avoid extinction of the species, then
the parameter ￿ that appears in the sustainable preference representing the
weight give to the long run future, is identi￿ed with the marginal utility of this
renewable resource at the point of its possible extinction.
We need a few de￿nitions. In this section we use both discrete time t =
1;2;:::and continuous time t 2 R to facilitate the comparison with the litera-
ture, using a single notation for simplicity: let L1(R) to be the space of essen-
tially bounded real valued functions on R, with
￿
L1(R) the closed subspace of
functions that have a limit at in￿nity, limg!1 ￿g < 1 a:e; with discrete time
(replacing R by the integers Z) these two spaces L1(R) and
￿
L1(R) become
the spaces of bounded sequences of real numbers l1 used in previous sections,
and
￿
l1 the subspace of sequences that have a limit at in￿nity, respectively.
Observe that the space L1(R) ￿ L2(R;￿) = the Hilbert space of all square
integrable measurable real valued functions with the measure v on R where the
measure ￿ is ￿nite on R as above, see [14]. Observe also that the space L2(R;￿)
contains functions that are neither bounded, nor go to zero at in￿nity, since
the measure v is ￿nite. We now de￿ne ￿ weighted￿Sobolev spaces, which were
introduced in optimal growth and general equilibrium theory in [19] [14] [18],
[17]). Ck(R) is the space of k￿ times di⁄erentiable functions with the Ck norm
k f kk= Supx2R j f(x);Df(x);:::Dkf(x) j;0 5 k 5 1; and for any integer s ￿ 0
de￿ne the Sobolev norm k : ks as k f ks=
Z X
05k5s
j Dkf(x) j2 dx: The Sobolev
Space Hs(R) is the completion of C1(R) under this norm. This space includes
measurable functions that may be discontinuous. The ￿ weighted￿Sobolev space
12Hs(R;v) is the Sobolev space Hs(R) with R endowed with a ￿nite measure v as
above. All Sobolev spaces are Hilbert spaces. Weighted Sobolev spaces contain
unbounded real valued function on R. Using Sobolev￿ s Theorem as extended
to weighted Sobolev spaces in Chichilnisky [14], one can ensure the continuity
and smoothness of solutions, and also that closed and bounded subsets of Hs
are compact as needed for the existence of solutions. In most function spaces,
such as L1 , a closed bounded set is not generally compact.25
Sobolev Theorem : ([54],[18][19]) Let s > k +1=2: Then Hs(R) ￿ Ck(R)
and the inclusion is continuous and compact.
Under the above conditions:
Theorem 3: Assume that for some K > 0 the two problems below have
unique solutions. Then the two optimization problems are equivalent:
Problem 1: Optimize a standard concave continuous increasing preference
W : L1(R) ! R





￿(x)f(x)dx; f(x) 2 L2(R;v)





Problem 2: Optimize a corresponding sustainable preference26 W￿(￿) :
￿
L1
























The parameter ￿ can be identi￿ed as the ￿ marginal utility at the point of





computed at a path ￿￿ that satis￿es 1 > limg!1 ￿(x) = K; where K > 0 is
as in Problem 128
25For example, in in￿nite dimensional Banach spaces the closed unit ball is never compact.
26As de￿ned in Theorem 2 above
27The function ￿(￿) was de￿ned in Theorem 2 as an extension of the function limx!1 ￿(x)
to all of L1:
28In Problem 2, @
@￿W(￿) represents the Frechet derivative of the function W with respect
to the variable ￿ 2 l1; and ￿(￿) is a purely ￿nitely additive measure on l1; 0 < ￿ < 1:
13Proof:
The space L1 (R) is a Banach space that is contained in the weighted
Hilbert space L2(R;￿) = H0(R;v) because by assumption v is a ￿nite measure
on R see [14]. The preference W : L1 ! R is a continuous linear function that
is extendable to all L2 (R;v), an extension denoted also W : L2 (R;v) ! R;
since by the the assumptions on Problem 1, the ￿ kernel￿in W is in L2 , namely
f(x) 2 L2(R;v):
Since W is linear and continuus, W is Frechet di⁄erentiable on L2(R;v);
and we may use calculus in Hilbert spaces to de￿ne the Frechet derivative of
W which is the analogue of standard derivatives in euclidean space. Under
these conditions to establish the result one may apply Theorem 1 p. 243 of
Luenberger [51] and Theorem 1 of Chichilnisky and Kalman p. 495 [20] that
characterizes optimal solutions to contrained optimization problems in weighted
Hilbert spaces.
To provide an intuitive motivation it is helpful to supply a simple ￿nite
dimensional analogue, since RN is also a Hilbert space. Observe that Problem
1 above is formally equivalent in ￿nite dimensional cases to optimizing a concave
continuous increasing function de￿ned on RN (for some N > 0) together with a







￿(N) = ￿N ￿ K > 0:
Observe that for any real number ￿ > 0; an optimum of a function F(￿) is
also an optimum of the function ￿:F(￿) and viceversa.
By standard results of constrained maximization in euclidean spaces, since
W is increasing, the maximum of the above problem is achieved at a boundary
of the constraint set, so there exists a ￿ > 0 for which the maximum of Problem
1 coincides with the maximum of the following problem:
Max￿2RNW(￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿N)
By the above observation, for any ￿; 0 < ￿ < 1; this is a a maximum of
(1=1 ￿ ￿)(W(￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿N)
namely





and (1 ￿ ￿) =
1 ￿ 2￿
1 ￿ ￿
140 < ￿ < 1; where the expression Max￿2RN(1 ￿ ￿)W(￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿N) has
the form of a "sustainable preference" as in Problem 2. Resolving this (￿nite
dimensional) Problem 1 implies
@
@￿










The argument above exhibits the formal equivalence between a solution of
Problems 1 and 2 above in ￿nite dimensional euclidean space. A similar result
holds in Hilbert spaces, which are the closest analog of euclidean space in in￿nite
dimensions. Under the conditions of Theorem 3 we may apply Theorem 1 p.
243 of Luenberger [51], and Theorem 1 p.495 of Chichilnisky and Kalman [20]
on contrained optimization in in￿nite dimensional vector spaces, obtaining a
similar result as that presented above for the in￿nite dimensional case. Consider
Problem 1 de￿ned on the weighted Hilbert space L2(R;v). If for some K > 0;





then there exists a ￿ such that ￿ is also optimal for the problem
Max￿2L2W(￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ lim
x!1￿(x))
or, equivalently, as shown above ￿ is optimal for the problem







0 < ￿ < 1:
Observe that the function ￿(x) = limx!1 ￿(x) that appears in the second
term of W￿ in Problem 2 is well de￿ned and (by de￿nition) a linear function,
under the assumptions on the contraint space
￿
L1(R). The parameter ￿ is given





15Therefore under the conditions, resolving Problem 1 for an appropriate K >
0 , is equivalent to resolving Problem 2 for an appropriate ￿ =
￿
1￿￿ that depends
on K . This completes the proof.￿
Observe that in Theorem 3 we have assumed the existence of unique solu-
tions to both Problems. The following result establishes existence. Problem 1 in
Theorem 3 is standard in the literature and the existence of solutions has been
established with or without concavity; for the non concave case see Chichilnisky
[14]. What remains to be established is the existence of solutions to Problem 2,
which is not standard since the criterion to be optimized is a sustainable pref-
erences satisfying the axioms of equal treatment of the present and the future.
We see below that existence with sustainable preferences is assured when there
are bounds to the variation of the feasible paths, such as limits in the change
of a species population through time. These seem natural conditions for exis-
tence, since biological populations have adjustment limitations, and therefore
limited variability, through time. For this purpose, Sobolev￿ s theorem is partic-
ularly useful as it provides compactness conditions that are similar to "bounded
variation" conditions.
As before, let W￿ : L1 ! R be a continuous sustainable preference satis-
fying the two Axioms presented above.
Theorem 4. If the feasible set of paths ￿ ￿ L1 is bounded and closed
in the norm of Hs and s ￿ 1; then there exists a solution to the sustainable
optimization Problem 2 within ￿.
Proof:
The proof establishes existence of solutions by a continuity and compactness
argument. It requires to establish compactness of the feasible set of functions
￿ in the same topology where the function W￿ is continuous. The result is
obtained by using bounded variation conditions on the functions in ￿, more
speci￿cally Sobolev￿ s theorem as stated above. First observe that the function
W￿ is continuous when restricted to the space Co(R); where Co(R) ￿ L1 (R) is
the subspace of L1 (R) of continuous bounded real valued functions on R. The
next step is to observe that L1(R) ￿ H0 (R) = L2 (R) since the measure v is
￿nite, cf. [14]. By the assumptions and Sobolev￿ s theorem the feasible subset ￿
￿ L1 (R) consists of continuous real valued functions on R since by Sobolev￿ s
theorem Hs ￿ Co when s > 1=2 and we assumed that s ￿ 1: Recall that the
inclusion H1 ￿ C0 is compact by Sobolev￿ s theorem and the set ￿ is closed and
bounded by assumption. Therefore the set ￿ is compact in C0 ￿ L1 . Finally,
by assumption W￿ is continuous on L1 . Therefore under the conditions there
exist a solution to Problem 2 of Theorem 3 in the set ￿.￿
7.1 The Axiom of Choice
It is worth mentioning that the correspondence between Problem 1 and Problem
2 established in Theorem 3 above is itself equivalent to the well known Axiom
of Choice at the foundations of Mathematics. The reason is as follows. The
Frechet derivative in Theorem 3 exists because the function W is by construction
continuous and linear [12]. However, the actual construction of a function that
16represents the Frechet derivative is not possible in all cases, since this requires
the use of a Hahn - Banach theorem, and in general Hahn Banach theorem
depends on using the Axiom of Choice for the construction of a separating
hyperplane. Kurt Godel [40] established that the most general solutions to the
construction problems just mentioned (e.g. the hyperplanes in Hahn Banach
Theorem) are independent of the rest of the axioms of mathematics: they can
neither be established nor negated, as are the Continuum Hypothesis and the
Axiom of Choice.
8 No Prior Criteria are Sustainable Preferences
Although the axioms presented here are reasonable, all preferences considered
in the literature so far fail to satisfy them.
Proposition 2
The following criteria for evaluating time paths fail the sustainability axioms
[15] including completeness and sensitivity :
(a) the sum of discounted utilities, for any ￿xed discount factor no matter
how small, because it is always a dictatorship of the present, as established in
Chichilnisky [12],
(b) Ramsey￿ s criterion, which is seriously incomplete and therefore does not
satisfy the de￿nition of a sustainable preference see Chichilnisky [12] and [15],
(c) the overtaking criterion, because it is also incomplete, see Chichilnisky
[15]
(d) lim inf, which is a dictatorship of the future [?],
(e) long-run averages, because it is a dictatorship of the future and also
incomplete29
(f) Rawlsian rules because it is insensitive [15] as it ranks equally two paths
that treat equally those who are worst o⁄, no matter how everyone else (includ-
ing in￿nitely many generations) is treated
(g) Basic Needs satis￿es continuity and the two equal treatment axioms but
it is insensitive as de￿ned in [15], since it ranks equally two paths that have
the same in￿mum - even though one may assign a much higher utility to many
(even to in￿nitely many) generations.
(h) The Green Golden Rule g￿ de￿ned in [5] as a stationary path g￿ =
fc￿;s￿g that achieves the maximum utility level that is sustainable forever, that
is, g￿ = max u(c;s) subject to c < R(s) .
For de￿nitions and proofs see the Appendix. ￿
29For example the two sequences (1, 0, 0,111, 0, 0, 0, 0,1,1,1,1,1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,1 . . . . )
and (0,1,1, 0, 0, 0, 1,1,1,1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,1,1,1,1,1,1, 0. . . . ) are not comparable according to
the long-run averages criterion .
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9.1 Continuity
In practical terms the continuity of W is the requirement that there should exist
a su¢ cient statistic for inferring the welfare criterion from actual data. This
is an expression of the condition that it should be possible to approximate as
closely as desired the welfare criterion W by sampling over large enough ￿nite
samples of utility streams. Continuity of a sustainable criterion function W is
not needed in Theorem 1; it is used solely for the characterization in Theorem
2. Continuity is de￿ned here in terms of the standard topology of ￿ sup norm￿
de￿ned by k f k = supx2R j f(x) j : This topology was ￿rst used in economics
by Debreu [38].
DEFINITION 8 A sustainable preference is a complete continuos preference
de￿ned on L1 satisfying Axioms 1 and 2.
9.2 Previous Welfare Criteria
To facilitate comparison, this subsection de￿nes some of the more widely used
prior welfare criteria . A function W : l1 ! R is called a discounted sum of
utilities if it is of the form: W(￿) =
P1
g=1 ￿g,￿g where 8g, ￿g ￿ 0 and
P
￿g<1
; ￿g is called a discount factor
Ramsey￿ s welfare criterion (Ramsey [52]) ranks a utility stream ￿ = (￿g)
g = 1;2;::: above another ￿ = (￿g) g = 1;2;::: if the utility stream ￿ is "closer"
to the bliss path, namely to the sequencet = (1;l;:::;1::::), than is the sequence
￿ . Formally:
P1
g=1 1 ￿ ￿g <
P1
g=1 1 ￿ ￿g:
A Rawlsian rule (Rawls [53]) ranks two utility streams according to which
has a higher in￿mum value of utility for all generations. This is a natural
extension of the criterion proposed initially by Rawls [53]. Formally : a utility
stream a is preferred to another if inf(￿g) > inf(￿g):The criterion of satisfaction
of basic needs introduced in Chichilnisky [9], [10] ranks a utility stream ￿ over
another ￿ if the time required to meet basic needs is shorter in ￿ than in ￿.
Formally : T(￿) 5 T(￿) where T(￿) = minft : ￿g > bg, for a given b which
represents basic needs. The overtaking criterion (von Weizacker [57]) ranks a
utility stream ￿ over another ￿ if ￿ eventually leads to a permanently higher








The long-run average criterion can be de￿ned in our context as follows: a utility
stream ￿ is preferred to another ￿ if in average terms, the long-run aggregate
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) denote the ￿eld of all subsets of a set S with the operations of
unions and intersections of sets . A real valued, bounded additive set function
on (S;
P
) is one which assigns a real value to each element of (S;
P
), and assigns
the sum of the values to the union of two disjoint sets .
DEFINITION 13 .
A real valued bounded additive set function is called countably additive if it
assigns the countable sum of the values to a countable union of disjoint sets.
EXAMPLE 1.
Probability measures on the real numbers, R, or on the integers Z, are typical
examples of countably additive functions. Any sequence of positive real numbers
f￿gg g = 1:;;::; such that
P
￿g <1 de￿nes a countably additive measure ￿ on
the integersZ, by the rule ￿(A) =
P
g2A ￿g , 8A ￿ Z:
DEFINITION 10.
A real valued bounded additive set function ’ on (S;
P
) is called purely ￿-
nitely additive (see Yosida and Hewitt [58] [59]) if whenever a countably additive
function ￿ satis￿es: 8A 2 (S;
P
); ￿(A) < ’(A) then ￿(A) = 0 8A 2 (S;
P
):
This means that the only countably additive measure which is absolutely con-
tinuous with respect to a purely ￿nitely additive measure is the measure that
is identically zero.
EXAMPLE 2.
Any real valued linear functionV : l1 ! Rde￿nes a bounded additive func-
tion V on the ￿eld(Z;
P
) of subsets of the integers Z as follows: 8A ￿ Z,
a
V (A)
= V (￿A) where ￿A is the "characteristic function" of the set A, namely the
sequence de￿ned by ￿A = f￿A
g g;g = 1;2;:::such that ￿A
g = 1 = 1 if g 2 A and
￿A
g = 0 otherwise .
EXAMPLE 3. Typical purely ￿nitely additive set functions on the ￿eld of
all subsets of the integers, (Z;
P
), are the liminf function on l1, de￿ned for
each by lim inf(￿) = lim inff￿gg g = 1;2;:::Recall that the lim inf of a
sequence is the infimum of the set of points of accumulation of the sequence
.The "long ￿ run averages" function is another example: it is de￿ned for each











It is worth noting that a purely ￿nitely additive set function ￿ on the ￿eld
of subsets of the integers (Z;
P
) cannot be represented by a sequence of real
numbers in the sense that there exists no sequence of positive real numbers,
￿ = f￿gg which de￿nes ￿, that is, there is for no ￿ such that 8A ￿ Z;￿(A) = P
n2A ￿n: For example the lim inf : l1 ! R, de￿nes a purely ￿nitely additive
set function on the integers which is not representable by a sequence of real
numbers.
199.4 Proof of Theorem 1
PROOF.
See also [12]. To establish the existence of a sustainable preference it su¢ ces
to exhibit a function W : l1 ! R satisfying the two axioms. For any ￿ 2 l1
consider W(￿) =
P
￿g￿g +lim(￿g) g = 1;2:: . . 8￿ = (￿g), with a well de￿ned
limg!1 ￿g , and lim(￿g) extended to all of l1 using Hahn Banach￿ s theorem.
W satis￿es the axioms because it is a well-de￿ned, non-negative, increasing
function on l1; it is not a dictatorship of the present (Axiom 1) because its
second term makes it sensitive to changes in the "tails" of sequences; it is not a
dictatorship of the future (Axiom 2) and because its ￿rst term makes it sensitive
to changes in "cuto⁄s" of sequences. The next task is to show that the following
welfare criteria do not de￿ne sustainable preferences: (a) Ramsey￿ s criterion, (b)
the overtaking criterion, (c) the sum of discounted utilities, (d) lim inf, (e) long-
run averages (f) Rawlsian criteria, and (g) basic needs. The Ramsey￿ s criterion
de￿ned above fails because it is not a well-de￿ned real valued function on all of
l1 and cannot therefore de￿ne a complete order on l1. To see this it su¢ ces to
consider any sequence for which the sum does not converge. For example, let ￿
= ( ￿g;g = 1;2;:::where 8g,￿g = (g ￿ 1)=g. Then ￿g ! 1 so that the sequence
approaches the "bliss" consumption path ￿ = (1;1;:::;1::::): The ranking of ￿
is obtained by the sum of the distance between a and the bliss path. Since
limN!1
PN
g=1(1 ￿ ￿g) does not converge, Ramsey￿ s welfare criterion does not
de￿ne a sustainable preference as de￿ned. The overtaking criterion de￿ned
above is not a well-de￿ned function of l1, since it cannot rank those pairs of
utility streams in which neither ￿ overtakes ￿ nor ￿ overtakes ￿. Figure 2 in
Chichilnisky [15] exhibits a typical pair of utility streams which the overtaking
criterion fails to rank. The long-run averages criterion de￿ned above and the
lim inf criterion de￿ned above fail on the grounds that neither satis￿es Axiom
2; both are dictatorships of the future. Finally any discounted utility criterion
of the form W(￿) =
P
￿g￿g for 8g;￿g > 0 and
P
￿g < 1 is a dictatorship of
the present, as shown in Chichilnisky [12] and therefore fails to satisfy Axiom 1.
Finally the Rawlsian welfare criterion and the criterion of satisfaction of basic
needs do not de￿ne independent sustainable preferences: the Rawlsian criterion
de￿ned above fails because it is not sensitive to the welfare of many generations:
only to that of the less favored generation . Basic Needs has the same drawback.
￿
9.5 Proof of Theorem 2
PROOF. Consider a continuous independent sustainable preference that satis-
￿es Axioms 1 and 2, so there exists a utility representation for W. The welfare
criterion W : l1 ! R;de￿nes a non-negative, continuous linear functional on l1
. As seen above in Example 3, such a function de￿nes a non-negative, bounded,
additive set function denoted W on the ￿eld of subsets of the integers Z;(Z;
P
).
The representation theorem of Yosida and Hewitt (Yosida [58]; Yosida and He-
witt [59]) establishes that every non-negative, bounded, additive set function
20on (S;
P
), the ￿eld of subsets
P
of a set S can be decomposed into the sum
of a non-negative measure ￿ and a purely ￿nitely additive, which is a non-
negative set function ￿ on (S;
P
): It follows from this theorem that W can be
represented as the sum of a countably additive measure ￿ and a purely ￿nitely
additive measure ￿ on the integers Z. It is immediate to verify that this is the
representation provided above. To complete the characterization proof that it
is an independent sustainable preference it su¢ ces now to show that neither ￿
nor ￿ are identically zero This follows from Axioms 1 and 2: we saw above
that discounted utility is a dictatorship of the present, so that if ￿ u 0, then
W would be a dictatorship of the present, contradicting Axiom 1. If on the
other hand ￿ u 0, then W would be a dictatorship of the future because all
purely ￿nitely additive measures are, by de￿nition, dictatorships of the future,
contradicting Axiom 2. Therefore neither ￿ nor ￿ can be identically zero. This
completes the proof of the theorem.￿
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